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The process of contraction, like the process of expansion,is cumulative and self-
reinforcing. Once started, no matter how, there is a tendency for it to go on, even if the 
force by which it was provoked has in the meantime ceased to operate. 
Gottfried Haberler, Prosperity and Depression, 1937 
 
 In our recent paper, (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010) we examine the behavior of 
real GDP (levels and growth rates), unemployment, inflation, bank credit, and real estate 
prices in a twenty one-year window surrounding selected adverse global and country-
specific shocks or events.  In this note, we summarize some of the main findings of that 
paper, including that economic growth is notably slower in the decade following a 
macroeconomic disruption.  We extend those results to provide evidence of several post-
crisis “double dips” in the years following the crisis.  A faltering of economic recovery is 
not uncommon after a severe financial shock, although this can often be ascribed to 
exogenous events.    
The episodes we study include the 1929 stock market crash, the 1973 oil shock, 
the 2007 U.S. subprime collapse, and fifteen severe post-World War II financial crises. 
The focus was not on the immediate antecedents and aftermath of these events but on 
longer horizons that compare decades rather than years.1 
1. Methodology preamble 
                                                 
1
 Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) was prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole 
Symposium, Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, August 26-28, 2010 
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The statistical analysis, which is described in more detail in the paper, is based on 
nonparametric comparisons of the data that are applied to the episodes listed in Table 1.  
Simply put, we examine if key macroeconomic indicators seem to come from the same 
distribution before and after a dislocating event.  The exact time periods of the  before-
and-after windows vary across our exercises, but we usually try to employ the longest 
possible spans of comparison. 
Table 1. Episodes and Coverage 
 
3 global episodes 
 
 
1929, 1973, 2006 
15 country-specific severe financial crises   
       Advanced economies  Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 
1991, Japan 1992 
       Asian crisis emerging markets Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand, all 1997 
       Other emerging markets Chile 1981,  Mexico 1994, Colombia 1998, 
Argentina 2001, and Turkey 2001 
 
 
2. Growth, GDP levels, and unemployment 
Real per capita GDP growth rates are significantly lower during the decade 
following severe financial crises and the synchronous world-wide shocks.  The median 
post-financial crisis GDP growth decline in advanced economies, as shown in Figure 1, 
is about 1 percent.  
During the first three years following the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis (2008-2010), 
median real per capita GDP income levels for all the advanced economies is about 2 
percent lower than it was in 2007; this is comparable to the median output declines in the 
first three years after the fifteen severe post World War II financial crises.  However, 82 
percent of the observations for per capita GDP during 2008 to 2010 remain below or 
equal to the 2007 income level. The comparable figure for the fifteen crises episodes is 
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60 percent, indicating that during the current crisis episode recessions have been deeper, 
more persistent, and widespread.  
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Figure 1.  Real Per Capita GDP Growth in the Decade Before and the Decade After 
Severe Financial Crises: Post-WWII, Advanced Economies 
 
Probability density function 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) and sources cited therein. 
 
In the ten-year window following severe financial crises, unemployment rates are 
significantly higher than in the decade that preceded the crisis. The rise in unemployment 
is most marked for the five advanced economies, where the median unemployment rate is 
about 5 percentage points higher (Figure 2).  In ten of the fifteen post-crisis episodes, 
unemployment has never fallen back to its pre-crisis level, not in the decade that 
followed nor through end-2009. 
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Figure 2. Unemployment Rate in the Decade Before and the Decade After Severe 
Financial Crises: Post-WWII, Advanced and Asian Economies 
 
Probability density function, five advanced economies 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) and sources cited therein. 
 
3. Housing and credit 
 
Real housing prices for the full period is available for ten of the fifteen financial 
crisis episodes.  For this group, over an eleven-year period (encompassing the crisis year 
and the decade that followed), about 90 percent of the observations show real house 
prices below their level the year before the crisis.  Median housing prices are 15 to 20 
percent lower in this eleven-year window, with cumulative declines as large as 55 
percent.  The observations on unemployment and house prices, of course, may be related, 
as a protracted slump in construction activity that accompanies depressed housing prices 
may help to explain persistently higher unemployment. 
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Figure 3.  Real House Prices Before and Ten Years After Severe Financial Crises:  
Ten Post-WWII Episodes 
 
Probability density function:  Advanced economies 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Sources: Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) and sources cited therein. 
 
Another important driver of the cycle is the leverage of the private sector.  In the 
decade prior to a crisis, domestic credit/GDP climbs about 38 percent and external 
indebtedness soars. Credit/GDP declines by an amount comparable to the surge (38 
percent) after the crisis.  However, deleveraging is often delayed and is a lengthy process 
lasting about seven years.  The decade that preceded the onset of the 2007 crisis fits the 
historic pattern.  If deleveraging of private debt follows the tracks of previous crises as 
well, credit restraint will damp employment and growth for some time to come. 
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4. Double dips and external shocks 
 
 The media is filled with concerns about a “double dip,” or that the economic 
recovery will stall out after only a few quarters of growth.  Our analysis is based on 
annual data, so brief spurts of growth bracketed by output declines might be smoothed 
away in yearly observations.  But a more general pattern, often applied to Japan’s 
experience in the late 1990s (which actually stretches the window to encompass the 5th 
and 6th year after the crisis), is documented in Table 2.  Of the 15 post World War II 
episodes examined, nearly one half of these (seven episodes) involved a broadly-defined 
double dip.   
As shown in Table 2, growth rates often became negative once more after the 
crisis. The magnitude of the slowdown (measured as the highest post-crisis growth rate 
less the lowest recorded subsequently) also provides a sense of the loss of momentum.  
These post-crisis downturns help explain why growth rates are significantly lower and 
unemployment rates higher in the decade after the crisis and why there results are not 
driven by weak economic performance that is common in the vicinity of the crisis. 
Concluding observations 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)  and our paper document for the public and 
private sectors, respectively, the years following severe financial crises are characterized 
by high levels of debt and leveraging.   This observation is essential in understanding 
why these financially frail economies are particularly vulnerable to adverse shocks, 
whether they emanate from the demand and supply factors discussed in our paper.  A 
drag on spending might owe to mistakes in domestic policies or hysteresis effects of the 
crisis.  But the list of event in Table 2 suggests that there is an important role for plain 
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“bad luck,” originating in exogenous events or external developments that strike at a 
time when the economy remains highly vulnerable.  
 
Table 2. Episodes of a marked slowdown or recession in 3rd or 4th year after the crisis 
 
  Annual per capita GDP 
growth 
 
Country Crisis year 
(beginning) 
Lowest 
growth rate 
Magnitude 
of slowdown 
(high- low) 
Year(s) of 
slowdown 
External (or exogenous) 
shock(s) 
Spain 1 1977 -0.2 2.9 1981 High world interest rates; 
recession in advanced 
economies.  The Latin 
American debt crisis gets 
underway. 
Chile 1981 0.4 3.8 1985 Renewed weakness in 
commodity prices, which 
fall 10-15 percent that year 
(depending on index used). 
Malaysia 1997 -1.6 8.0 2001 
Philippines 1997 -0.5 4.2 2001 
Thailand 1997 1.4 2.6 2001 
Colombia 1998 -0.2 1.3 2001-2002 
For the Asian economies 
concerns about the avian 
flu begin in earnest in May 
2001; for all the recovering 
countries 9/11 poses a 
major blow to world trade. 
The trade volume of goods 
and services, which had 
risen by 12.2 percent in 
2000 is flat in 2001, rising 
0.2 percent. 
Memorandum item, a 5th-6th year recession 
Japan 1 1992 -3.2 6.4 1997-1999 Asian crisis.  Japanese 
banks had begun to lend 
aggressively to emerging 
Asia in early 1996; these 
are now hit with fresh 
losses. 2 
1
 It is important to note that, unlike the other 13 financial crises in our sample Spain 1977 and Japan 1992 
“escaped” an initial recession at the time of crisis. 
2  See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for an analysis of the patterns of bank lending during the Asian crisis. 
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